This article proposes the convergence between enactivism, an anthropological view of social life, and a philosophy of ethic of care. The main conceptual proposal is the extension of the notion of concern, present in the enactive philosophy, into the domain of social participation. The proposal introduces the notion that care in social life corresponds to a richer version of the basic living concern of the organism. In the enactive philosophy of the organism, concern appears as a link between the dynamical precariousness of the living system and the emerging properties of lived experience. Social participation, informed by an anthropology of social practice, is characterised as a multi-scale process of construction and maintenance of group and multi-individual identities. This article presents a caring practice perspective in order to capture the richness of life's concern in social life. In this way, it stretches the life and mind continuity towards social dynamics. The construction and maintenance of group and individual identities in social life is a process that requires a form of concern that is best defined as care. The proposal characterises caring practices as both explicitly ethical and implicitly ecologically emerging. Finally, this article points towards an envisioned enactive anthropology of caring that unpacks the dynamics and phenomenology of social life.
Introduction to the caring practice perspective
The enactive approach to mind and life offers a view of interdependent dynamical processes that together bring to life an embodied Self and its worldly domain of interactions. Such interdependencies extend well beyond the skull and skin (or membrane) of the individual organism. With this in mind, the current proposal articulates a view of social life in which the dynamics proper to the participatory organisation of groups of individuals plays an important role in the co-emergence of Selves and social niches. This focus on participatory organisational processes is, however, a topic of discussion largely ignored by conventional cognitive approaches. Contemporary views on cognition inherit the de facto individualism of orthodox cognitive science and thus see sociality and social life in a generic and weak contextual way. Social life is, in contrast, a conventional theme in anthropological discussions. The current proposal offers an envisioned anthropological approach to social life from the perspective of an enactive philosophy (I do not make a systematic review of positions in anthropology).
In order to do so, I propose that the notion of concern, at the heart of the enactive philosophy of the organism (Thompson, 2007) , can be recast in terms of caring in social practices. In short, caring establishes a link between the individual organism's enactment of vital values and the enactment of the values of the social group by virtue of the living concern that extends beyond the individual. In the following section, I set the terrain for what I call the caring practice perspective with a brief review of the enactive philosophy of the organism and the basic notion of concern.
A relational definition of care
As a starting point, I propose to look at the experience of social life from within the practices of care. This view brings elements from existing theories of ethics of care, particularly a definition of ethic in fully relational terms. The perspective presented is to an extent based in the ethics of care proposed by philosophers and feminism theorists Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher. Ethics of care is already a wide field with multiple voices and reaching back more than 30 years (see Gilligan, 1988; Noddings, 1984, among others) . Central to this field is the definition of care. I take Fisher and Tronto's paradigmatic definition of care as a starting point. For them,
On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. (Tronto & Fischer, 1990 , p. 40 in Tronto 1993 /2009 I suggest that, in contrast to other definitions of caring available in the literature, the above is broad enough to include instances of engagements that are neither limited to the well-known caring dyads (e.g. mother and child, nurse and elder) nor constrained to intra-species relations. The scope of the definition indeed includes our dependent relations with the environment (personal, local or global) and the biosphere at large. The definition also characterises caring as a practice. Such skilful activity is centred around values and conservative aspects involving well-being within complex interdependent relations.
The current proposal seeks to expand the definition above by introducing a theorisation of ecologically emerging processes in social life. The ethical view is in part based on an everyday sense of care in which caring is something that persons do, that is, a type of activity that a person does with particular intentions and beliefs (e.g. beliefs about well-being of self/others). This definition can be extended. The proposal aims at providing the initial definition of care with a naturalistic ground based on the idea that implicit ecologically emerging processes characterise social life. These are processes that manifest organisational properties beyond the individual and simultaneously transform the person's meaningful relationships to the social group. To put it in a way, caring is not only something that a person does explicitly but also what the person implicitly undergoes through the emerging dynamics of social life. This will become clear through an elaboration of the organisational properties of social life in later sections.
What follows is thus a presentation of a view that I call the caring practice perspective. With this, I intend to integrate aspects of the mind and life continuity with concepts found in the anthropological literature on social life. Moreover, the proposal places the enactive approach in close relation with a view on the ethics of care. The latter move, I suggest, continues the conversation about the transformative aspects of the embodied mind project as established in Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) . However, a clarification is needed here, the current presentation of ideas does not elaborate on some of the main topics of ethics of care related to conditions of oppression, and the role of power and violence. Such elaboration is not only possible but also very needed, yet it escapes the space of the current presentation. Thus, the discussion will mostly remain on the level of connecting key concepts across a large range of, yet unconnected, disciplines.
Concern and the enactive philosophy of the organism
The enactive approach seeks to link the fundamental properties or processes at the basis of biological living and the processes of sense-making that distinctively characterise mental phenomena. The approach affirms that a non-reductionist view of the coupling of organism and environment is necessary for understanding the mind; accordingly, the mind should not be seen as an abstract realm functionally independent of the particular ecological exchanges and interdependencies of the organism (hereafter I follow closely Thompson (2007) ). Moreover, the approach rejects internalism; thus, rather than seeing firing neurons that together somehow make up mentality, enactivism sees the formal or organisational properties fundamental to the whole living body in relation to its niche as the reference point for any envisioned explanation of mentality (p. 128). The explication of this continuity takes two complementary views: a dynamical emergence account of the living body and a phenomenological account of the lived body. Together with the living/lived body distinction, I suggest to revisit other key notions of enactivism. These will serve to connect the enactive view with its expanded version into the terrain of social living and caring practices. These notions are Autonomy, Identity, Concern, Interiority and Value.
Autonomy and openness
Living bodies act in their own behalf as fully purposeful self-producing wholes (Kauffman, 2000) . Enactivism explains this basic observation with recourse to the notion of autonomy. In this view, the living system is seen as maintaining a kind of purposeful selfnormativity (Varela, 1979) . The contrast between living autonomy and the heteronomy of designed systems is telling. A non-enactivist sense of the word autonomy is usually applied to some human-designed machines (e.g. a self-driving car). Such machines require an algorithm that is conceived before the fact -before their actual encounters with environmental conditions and even before their physical construction. This is, however, a very weak sense of the word. A so-called 'autonomous' robot, for example, is not autonomous in the sense proposed by enactivism because its 'autonomy' is precisely imposed by an externally made design principle (e.g. the layout of the connections between sensors and motors). Crucially, its 'autonomy' is not generated or emerging in the interaction loops of the robot (Nasuto, Bishop, Roesch, & Spencer, 2015; Ziemke, 2001) . In contrast, living autonomy needs a stronger definition. An 'autonomous' robot is thus in fact a heteronomous machine because its own organisation is conceived or governed externally to it (Thompson, 2007, p. 43) . A living body, in contrast, produces its own organisation -how the operational closure of its parts is arranged. This organisation emerges via ontogenetic differentiation in interaction with the world -unlike the robot whose organisation is given by externally conceived compositional design or preformed algorithms. This is the strong sense of the emergence of autonomy in life.
More closely, the contrast with a robot is evident in the fact that the living body is never identical to its specific physico-chemical states. This point is crucial to understand the productive fragility of life. Through constant dissipation and renewal precipitated by energy gradients, the living body cannot be identical to the materials that realise its structure at any moment. Its unity, as opposed to being the stable consequence of a construction from basic building blocks, is a selfsustaining organisation of the whole that requires constant endogenous work to counterbalance spontaneous thermodynamic degradation. This constant turnover of materials and energy dissipation makes the living body both constitutionally unstable and critically dependent on the conservation of its operational closure (Varela, 1991; Varela et al., 1974 ). Life's form, which emerges from matter, is continuously threatened by the very elements that are necessary to the ongoing process of its formation.
Autonomy is precisely that principle which is manifested in the system's integrity through change: an integrity under the taxing conditions of an environment from which the system itself is made. Clearly, the operational closure that needs to be conserved cannot be equal to a total isolation from the environment. As a system that can only exist and keep going by circulating matter and energy from the environment, the living being is a system primordially in tension (Di Paolo, 2005; Jonas, 1966) . For a living system, robust isolation is impossible, yet total openness to the surrounding flows of energy and matter is catastrophic (e.g. a materially open cell would dissipate in its surrounding chemical soup). An organism's unity or identity -through its operational closure that differentiates it from the surroundings -can only be maintained in the form of purposeful 'needy openness' to the world under precarious conditions (Di Paolo, 2005) . Ultimately, the natural purpose of the living body is to adaptively sustain its identity and regulate its conditions of viability.
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Purposefulness and the values of viable existence are thus conceived by the enactive approach as necessary emergent features of the living body (Di Paolo et al., 2010) . This stands in contrast to other views (e.g. eliminativism) that think of purposefulness and value as epiphenomenal -as an ascription from the observer. In enactivism, purpose and value are real, yet emergent, processes.
2 Crucially, the enactive view of purposefulness is grounded on the lived experience of 'concern' of the body (Thompson, 2007, p. 149) . With the notion of concern, we can now see the complementary side of the enactive approach: the lived body. For Thompson, making the transition from living to lived body: 'The organism's 'concern', its 'natural purpose', is to keep on going, to continue living, to affirm and reaffirm itself in the face of imminent not-being. Incessant material turnover and exchange with the environment is both a reason for this concern and the only way to meet it' (Thompson, 2007, p. 153) . From here, we can recognise the phenomenological idea of the emergence of an interiority characterised by a concern towards vital values.
Concern and sense-making
The lived body constitutes a locus of concern given its asymmetric relation with the environment. The coupling and interactions of environmental and organismic processes establish an emergent relational domain cutting across many levels of self-organising phenomena. However, the relational domain is not symmetric from the perspective of the lived body. Only the side of the organism can establish significance and valence within the relational domain by virtue of its inherent precariousness. The relational domain has significance and is valuable for someone in terms of the consequences that one's actions have for one's living (Thompson, 2007, p. 47) . In other words, the organism engages with the world in a way that renders this engagement in the terms stipulated by the organism itself and not the terms of the organism-independent descriptions of the world by a third party observer. The terms of the organism are those of immanent living-bound meaning: a 'surplus of significance' is necessarily cast upon an otherwise indifferent world (Varela et al., 1991) . Hence, an organism cannot afford to be simply neutrally coupled with the given facts of an environment; rather, its openness is fundamentally manifested as 'concern' (Kyselo & Di Paolo, 2013; Thompson & Varela, 2001 ). Moreover, this concern needs to be in terms of the anticipation of viable or unfavourable conditions (Jonas, 1966, p. 80; Weber & Varela, 2002) , that is, the organism does not relate to its world by staying aloof and reacting post factum to what comes from outside. Contrarily, concern is manifested as being alert, actively anticipating conditions and bringing forth vital values by virtue of the body's precariousness.
The notion of concern turns the view of the lived body from an image of a solipsistic interior, to one of an open system that is finely attuned to tendencies, sensitive to virtual traces and anticipating its own vital conditions of viability (Buhrmann, Di Paolo, & Barandiaran, 2013) . In sense-making, experience, cognition and living are intertwined with historical conditions and identitythat is, sense-making is the system's regulation that needs to occur 'in terms of the consequences that its [the system's] interactions have for the conservation of its identity ' (De Jaegher & Froese, 2009, p. 447) . Thus, the lived body is not so much a site of experience in some arrested, neutral and private way (as having the neutral experience of the redness of red when observing this or that red thing) but a source of concern projected towards the future.
The crucial point is that in the enaction of a domain of interactions the body creates an interiority.
3 In enactivist terms (Di Paolo, 2005) , the notion of interiority points to the emergence of a locus of concern within the wide, open, loopy and messy co-determination of an autonomous organism and its domain of interactions. Interiority is not'without' environment. On the contrary, it is openness from a perspective that is neither value neutral nor based on some form of information processing. This is ipso facto the self-production of phenomenal experience: the dynamical co-emergence of a significant world and a locus of concern. Sense-making is precisely the general concept that imbricates experience, feeling (emotion) and cognition in the double move of the creation of a world of significance and the production of an interiority. To sum up, a sense-maker is in the business of being autonomous by enacting a world of significant relations that manifest vital values which is simultaneously the production of its own affectladden interiority -its lived (phenomenal) experience.
Clarifying the explanatory unit of sense-making
Crucially, the body creates interiority but such interiority is not what constitutes the explanatory unit of sense-making. This is an important clarification; in Gallagher's terms, the explanatory unit of perception (or cognition, or action, etc.) is not the brain, or even two (or more) brains in the case of social cognition, but a dynamic relation between organisms, which include brains, but also their own structural embodied features that enable specific perceptionaction loops involving social and physical environments . (Gallagher & Bower, 2014, p. 242) Accordingly, the enactive approach does not hold the skull-bound (internalist) restriction of orthodox cognitive science. Moreover, it does not impose the individual-centred view of mentality as assumed by mainstream psychology (and some versions of phenomenology). Enactivism traces the emergence of a locus of concern and the emergence of an interiority to the asymmetrical relation between a precarious, autonomous organism and its environment. However, the actual processes that need to be seen as dynamically coupled in order to capture such emergent interdependencies extend widely outside the skin of the individual's body.
This important clarification allows us to turn now to the interdependent processes that extend throughout human social life. With this in mind, we may be able to conceive both wider systems of interdependent processes across many social bodies and the emergence, within those systems, of many differentiated firstperson perspectives.
Social life's properties are versions of life's properties
The enactive approach leaves open the possibility of linking the processes of basic life with processes of human socio-culture. The aforementioned non-internalist, non-individualist explanatory unit of sense-making affords this possibility. It offers a way of extending the organisational and phenomenological properties of basic life to social living. The proposal is thus to map the continuity of life and social life, understanding the latter as a relevant field of investigation for the enactive approach. In the following sections, I will emphasise a perspective on caring practices that tightly links some of the essential features of the proposed continuity. In this section, I touch on these features more generally.
To see how the properties of life as characterised in enactivism are continuous with social life, we need to observe the circular links between larger social dynamics and the person's sense-making. First, the organisational properties of social living are best captured by looking at the dynamics of social practice and participation in communities of practice (Bourdieu, 1977; Lave & Wenger, 1991) . In this view, persons become mature participants in social practices by virtue of their increasing skilful participation (I expand this below). In this way, social life is presented as an active living process of trans-personal growth in which the person is always fully immersed. We can thus avoid a view of social life (or culture) as a relatively fixed realm of representations to which the individual person simply arrives as an already constituted unit of sense-making. 5 Second, the conceptual link between the conservation of organismic identity and sense-making can be cashed out in terms of the double move of expansion and further conservation of the person's identity through participation in meaningful social practices. In the current proposal, this leads towards a perspective on caring practices whereby the core notions of concern and sense-making can be recast through a view of ecologically emerging processes of care -that is, the co-maintenance of group's and individual's dynamical identities.
From a social practice perspective, social life occurs as a constellation of long range and historical processes of multi-individual participation in communities. These are communities of interactors (Cuffari, Di Paolo, & De Jaegher, 2015) or, more generally, communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991) , ranging from our families, our school cohort, co-workers, to the myriad of groups to which we affiliate explicitly or implicitly throughout life (e.g. groupings that hold particular distinctions of taste, political appetites, etc.). These communities manifest temporary structures consisting of distribution of roles, values, norms and ways of parcelling out spaces and the uses of time.
Crucially, communities also manifest conservative processes of identity which simultaneously shape our own personal identities. In parallel to what we find in living bodies, communities are also subject to the contingent dynamics of renewal under precarious conditions. They cannot exist in any static or finished form; instead, they sustain integrity through change against ultimate dissipation. This renewal is simply the effect of generational passage: newcomers becoming old-timers in a constant flow of participants engaging in contingent interactions.
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Looking down to the individual in community, the passage of each participant can be characterised as consisting of processes of growth, learning and enskilment (Ingold, 2000) that are tightly linked to cumulative conservative tendencies of personal identity. This appeals directly to a way of seeing social life as bundles of processes of membership through enskilment within developmental cycles of participation. Membership, identity and skilful participation are closely intertwined from this perspective. Harking back to Vygotsky's theory of social development, Lave and Wenger, for example, assert that skill learning is not so much the effect of a supposed interiorisation via transmission of sets of instructions of 'how to do things' (via, for example, school instruction) as the move towards full participation in a community of practice; this move implies that the knowledgeable skills are inseparable from the membership and identity of the individual within the group. Moreover, the introduction of social life into the conceptual framework of enactivism allows a contextualisation of the notion of sense-making. Through the lens of social life, successful sense-making corresponds to skilful participation. In this view, learning, and more generally sense-making, can be translated into the long timescale of becoming of newcomers into old-timers within the concrete constraints imposed by the conventional distribution of tasks, roles and norms of existing communities.
In social life, the conservative tendencies of living processes manifest as the interlocking of personal identity growth and community-level self-producing dynamics. To put it in a way, the use value of participation for the individual is the conservation of a personal identity that grows with participation itself; in a circular fashion, this entails the reproduction of the means that conserve the participatory cycle itself. This circularity across levels and timescales is an ecologically emerging process that is reducible neither to the sum of joint actions between participants nor to the higherlevel dynamics of social systems. Ecologically emerging participatory processes thus parallel and cross-link with the organismic emerging processes of the bodyenvironment system across multiple timescales. These levels of emergence -the group, the body in its milieucan be conceptually disentangled in dynamical terms; however, a thorough understanding requires a wider view. We do not simply find ourselves carrying on with a life as autopoietic bodies in some form of 'here-andnow' coupling with a proximal environment. Rather, our bodies are intensively social in the sense that the conditions of viability, from which vital values derive, are criss-crossed by our participation in living communities in slower timescales. The living body, as proposed by enactivism, is the fundamental stream of significance: the autopoietic yet precarious living system is a centre of intense activity for which significance is immanent to its own adaptive self-production. Social life, as currently proposed, is the fundamental channel that shapes and specifies the animation proper to the body. Social life is a creative process by virtue of the many nested levels of constraints accumulated in evolutionary and socio-historical timescales, constraints that enable the emergence of patterns of orderly and ordering conduct. This shaping process occurs along a landscape of affiliations, tasks and activities jointly with others. In Ingold's (2015) words, social life is not something the person does but what the person undergoes: a process in which human beings both grow and are grown, undergoing histories of development and maturation -from birth through infancy and childhood into adulthood and old age -within fields of relationships established through the presence and activities of others. (p. 125) With an enactive view of social life, we are closer to an examination of the channels and streams of the individuation of the person. In the midst of social life, persons come into being together in a process that is inseparable from the many ways in which aspects of the environment and narratives become crystallised as objects, tokens and signs that serve as anchor points for the commonalities of objectified realities. Social life is a meshwork of growth and continuous ongoing formation that establishes 'on the go' its own conditions of viability in relation to the larger environment.
In what follows, I characterise the micro-timescale of social life via the concept of participatory sensemaking (PSM). Highlighting the autonomy focus of enactivism, social life, as a self-organising process of production and maintenance of distinct emerging identities, may be seen as the interplay of a variety of autonomies, namely, the individual's autonomy and the autonomy proper to instances of social interaction. PSM is a more fine-grained way of looking at the interplay of these different autonomies. With PSM, I return to the emergence of interiority as defined in the previous part but now with attention to the lived social practice.
Minimal social life: PSM
The notion of PSM (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007) conceptualises face-to-face encounters in terms of the coupling of different kinds of non-metabolic autonomies. It emphasises not only that individual agent-organisms manifest autonomy, but also that 'social interactions can take on an autonomy of themselves ' (De Jaegher & Froese, 2009, p. 456) . The minimal setting for PSM is the encounter of two persons that spontaneously coordinate their interactions yielding emergent structures of actions that cannot be attributed to each agent's individual or separate performance (think of a spontaneous dancing couple). That is, in a dyadic encounter, a third dynamic structure emerges and this structure affects the modulations of each participant (think of the specific movements of each dancer). More generally, as the De Jaegher and Froese put it, PSM proposes that social interactions can transform the participants' sensemaking in ways that are not accessible to each individual on their own. Individuals coordinate with one another, engaging in reciprocal intersubjective incorporation (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009) , whereby persons are said to directly participate in each other's sensemaking.
The basic mechanism is a form of reciprocal coordination (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007) . Dynamically, such coordination requires two (or more) individuals operating as one system within a particular state space. A naturalistic description of such dyadic system is the encounter of two persons walking in opposite directions in a narrow corridor where it is not uncommon to lock into a spontaneous yet unintended pattern of dance-like coordinated movements (until one person coordinates the coordination by uttering 'after you' or equivalent). The emergent structure is precisely manifested in that 'dance '. 7 In parallel with the dynamical description and phenomenological characterisation, PSM is also formulated in relation to other target concepts of enactivism such as agency. In the words of De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) , PSM is 'the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sensemaking can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own' (p. 497, emphasis added). New domains of social sense-making entail new norms and values that are accessible only in social interaction, but these new norms may be seen to rival the existing normativities of individuals (e.g. habitual patterns of behaviour). Cuffari et al. (2015) propose the existence of a primordial tension in the dialectical encounter of different kinds of autonomies (the individual's and the interaction's). Crucially, this 'double normativity' cannot be managed by an individual on their own; the individual can only modulate their couplings in relation to their self-normativity. So, the proposal is that the interaction may develop itself into forms of emergent agency that are only available socially. Following the norms of the interaction necessarily requires joint action. Thus, being able to modulate the interaction is to jointly enact social agency. As the authors propose, more complex forms of intersubjectivity beyond the local face-to-face encounter can be achieved by means of this dialectic and recursive process.
PSM highlights the necessary intercorporeal interdependency at the heart of more sophisticated forms of social life (Steiner, & Stewart, 2009 ). In what follows, I emphasise the phenomenal aspect that bridges basic life's concern and social life's care.
Transition to the interiority of social life
The invitation of the current proposal is to consider the experience of the mutual caring of co-animating persons within the emerging interiority of social life. I suggest that this step follows logically the enactivist dual (but not dualistic) perspective of the body as both living and lived. As aforementioned, the lived body -the body from within -is indeed most immediately present to us as a locus of concern. The phenomenology of concernthe value and affect-laden opening of the precarious organism to the world -is at the heart of the enactive approach to the interiority of sense-making. This multiple perspective of living body and lived bodily concern, whereby we understand the balance between the need for a conservative normativity of the organism and its necessary openness to the world, is best captured by the expression 'needful freedom' (Jonas, 1966 , in Di Paolo, 2005 . I suggest it follows from this multiple perspective that an approach to the interiority of social life -that is, the lived social life -needs to focus on caring as the nexus of intersubjectivity (experience in participation) and group dynamics (participation in social practices).
The proposal is thus to adopt a caring practice perspective. This perspective serves various purposes and highlights important homologies, briefly: it provides a thematic focus on the enactment of values of the community in relation to the individual's participation; it expands the phenomenological notion of concern as a structure of experience into the terrain of social life and caring practices; it defines both dynamically and experientially the co-emergence of identities in social life; it establishes a conceptual link between the enactive approach and the study of ethics of care; it articulates and describes the commonality across aesthetics, ethics and politics; and it serves as the basis for trans-domain communication and for further homologies between practices in social life.
From a phenomenological view, care is the selfmaintaining processes of social life seen from within. The perspective I propose -the view of the practices and the basic patterns -describes more clearly the affectivity and phenomenology occurring within the multi-individual dynamics of social life. In other words, I propose that the description of caring corresponds to one side of the coin and the other side is the conservative and self-sustaining process that emerges in the ecology of participatory cycles.
Multiple facets of care
The current proposal is based on a distinction between what may be called an ecologically emerging view of caring and the better known view of caring from an ethical and sociological standpoint. 8 The purpose of the distinction is to be able to characterise caring practices without restricting the discussion to practices that require complex socio-linguistic structures, such as those framed in institutional settings -for example, practices of client/patient care in the health sector. Thus, I highlight a kind of caring that derives from emerging and accumulated conservative tendencies in social life. This distinction is not equivalent to an ontological difference; instead, it is a distinction of levels of phenomena that share patterns of interdependence and dynamics of maintenance of relationships and enactment of values.
I suggest that this distinction is not only conceptual but also holds developmentally, although the evidence will not be elaborated in much detail here. Pre-verbal intersubjectivity (see Trevarthen, 1979 ) already shows signs of normative interactions that can be interpreted through the caring practice perspective. On the one hand, in early interactions, infants produce actions that seem to maintain emerging patterns of engagement with their caregivers.
9 On the other, as would be expected from motivated adults, caregivers also produce actions that tend to solicit further attentiveness from the infant, thus revealing a kind of normativity occurring in the engagement. The interpretation in relational terms, I propose, is that both partners (caregiver, infant) have an initial concern with the situation and produce caring actions according to what the situation needs in order for it to be maintained. The partners alternatively draw one another into further reciprocal activity and this involves a particular affective tone. This process and affectivity can be recognised as a basic form of caring practice in fully relational terms. I elaborate below the distinctions just mentioned with recourse to the theoretical links that can be established between the perspective I propose a selection of the literature on ethics of care on the one hand -the ethic link, and the particularities of the enactive approach to social life on the other -the ecologically emerging link.
The caring practice perspective and an ethic of care
The philosophical consideration of care as a concept in ethics has a long history in the context of feminist theory. As proposed by Tronto (1993 Tronto ( /2009 , the project of an ethic based on the aforementioned definition of care (see introduction) challenges, and seeks to overcome, 'three moral boundaries'. In Tronto's words, these have conventionally undermined an appropriate understanding of care and its ethical and political power. These are as follows: first, the boundary between public and private life, whereby caring is relegated to the sphere of the private, domestic and usually homely 'feminine'; second, the boundary of the moral point of view, whereby moral judgements assume an implicit or explicit moral distance and disinterested universality (think of Kantian moral philosophy). From this moral point of view, caring, in contrast to disinterested deliberation, seems too emotional (thus also rendered too 'feminine') and parochial (too situation specific) and thus only secondary to reasons and universal morals; third, the pervasive boundary that separates politics from morality. Against these boundaries, Tronto proposes an ethic of care that offers a morality based on actual practices of interdependency (including their affective dimension) closer to political life and beyond the gendered boundary between the private and the public life. As discussed by Tronto, the aim of an ethic of care, grounded in a feminist context, is not just to bring an alternative view of ethics -a supposedly 'women's morality'-to the table. At the centre of an ethic of care lies a philosophical discussion that seeks to overcome the failures of conventional moral theory in particular and entrenched assumptions in philosophy in general. Against traditional ethics, an ethic of care is concerned, not so much with the rules that the agent must follow, but with the kind of skilful engagement that occurs in the course of interactions between persons with needs. The problem of the tradition lies in the definition of individual persons in terms of ratio-cognitive autonomous agent 10 for whom ethics is a matter of disinterested judgements. The three moral boundaries to which Tronto (1993 Tronto ( /2009 refers are thus the symptoms of a specific modern mythology that depicts the full-blown moral individual as an achievement of the 'self-made man' (p. 177) -that is, the Cartesian individual who is disinterested (he may care about but does not give care) and whose self-made legitimacy rests on the disavowal of the care-giving of many others whose actions have made his life possible (and perhaps with the exception of romanticised notions of mother-child relations).
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An ethic of care may be a way of re-articulating notions of justice, equality and democracy in the light of the interdependency that supports sense-making, individuality and subjectivity. Coinciding with many voices in political feminism and queer critique (see, for example, Butler, 2004) , an ethic of care makes a clear point about the need to start our examinations from a position that makes visible the precariousness of the relational subject grounded in the universal vulnerability of our bodies (Vaittinen, 2015) . For example, Butler (2004) points to the commonality presented by the precariousness of our constitutively social bodies: 'loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure' (p. 20).
As already suggested by a few contemporary authors (see especially Urban, 2014 Urban, , 2015 , the preoccupation of an ethic of care with the constitutional precariousness of the individual and its fundamental relationality manifested in various forms of interpersonal dialectics (see Colombetti & Torrance, 2009; Kyselo, 2013) converges with an embodied, embedded, affective and ecologically rich view of human actions. The idea of social life as proposed in this work precisely aims at highlighting such precariousness, the way in which it is continuous with the organisational properties of living and the way it involves necessarily an ethical and political dimension. As mentioned by Urban (2015) , it is still to be seen how the convergence between an enactive approach to sociality and the ethic of care as presented here will lead to further mutual enrichment.
Linking the caring practice perspective
and the enactive philosophy of organism and identity
Caring, in fully relational terms, designates the kind of concern that arises in the interiority of social life. What this means is, first, that caring practices correspond to the phenomenologically informed side of social practices. Second, they correspond to the experiences of growing through individuation processes, that is, caring practices are practices dealing with identity as an experienced or lived process.
The notion of social practice that I borrow from sociology and social anthropology (section 3 above) focuses on the ways in which social life is self-producing and self-organising. However, it is a notion that comes from a relatively detached observer's perspective (e.g. the observation of human trans-generational turnover and cycles of participation). The notion of caring practice I propose, on the other hand, highlights the complementary view from within. In this view, persons may see themselves assuming different positions of care with respect to the meshwork of identities and skills in social life in which they are immersed.
12 Persons experience the values that are attached to their memberships to communities. They experience the demands for caring in appropriate ways with respect to their memberships. Simply put, persons can only be members through caring in the right way.
13
The aforementioned ethics of care elaborates on the phenomenal aspects with an attention to the positions of membership of participants, focusing on the conditions of oppression that manifest, for example, in cases in which the imposing demands for participating and caring in specific ways may in fact effect violence to the person (in certain cases, for example, caring practices do reproduce gender power asymmetries). For the current proposal, the emphasis is on how persons caring in the ways demanded by specific instances of participation enact the community, which in turn maintains the conditions for further participation. Going back to a theorisation of identity from an enactive philosophy of the organism, the caring practice perspective incorporates the phenomenological aspects of caring into a particular way of seeing individual persons historically as processes of individuation and maintenance of identity.
As pointed out, the individuation of the person is a process of specification through the constraints of participation; such specification requires a movement of increasing skilful participation in social practices. Viewing this insight in terms of a caring practice perspective implies that the movement towards full participation, which is in itself the specification of the person, necessarily involves a constellation of relational practices aiming at maintaining and repairing precarious interdependencies. This is necessarily so from a relational and non-individualistic approach.
14 In this proposal, skilful mature individuals are not merely the finished products of a process of maturation of individual capacities that come to be implemented, or secondarily rehearsed, in the context of social situations. Instead, tracing the person back to the earliest ontogenetic matrix, we see that the developmental system (Oyama, 2000) that forms the unity of the embryo and its early environment becomes the person system of the organism in communities. A skilful mature person is an ongoing achievement, derived from processes of individuation, that necessarily implies participation within cycles of care in social life.
A key speculative move is to conceive of the identity matrix of social participation as the locus of intertwined caring practices that criss-cross the gap between ethics and bodily self-maintenance. I propose that the idea already discussed of care from an ethical and sociological point of view is continuous with an ecologically emerging view of caring. Becoming a full participant in a community co-evolves with caring attitudes towards the Self and others, the personal autobiography and the values proper to the community. Becoming a skilful participant is in itself becoming a practitioner of care; taking, giving and receiving care permeate thoroughly the person's process of enskilment. Crucially, these processes of evolving attitudes and enskilment are not simply ethical in an explicitly socio-linguistic way. Explicit care, as an ethical 'code', belongs to only a portion of the caring practices that subtly sustain and maintain the co-production of personal identities. Such codes are the products of reification (Wenger, 1998) in the practice and often constitute narrative forms that support participation (i.e. an explicit ethic of care). In this way, the notion of caring practice is constituted by both narrative practices (themselves forms of reification of processes) and, more importantly for the present exposition, the underlying processes of identity construction and maintenance that we are not entirely able to grasp in our (explicit) narratives.
Social practices clearly include a myriad of activities that are not conventionally thought of as caring practices themselves. I propose that the present view speaks of the underlying living and lived interdependencies at the heart of many social phenomena in communities of practice. This view of caring practices thus extends well beyond the ethical proposal of Tronto and colleagues. Think, for example, of communities of artistic practice. For Tronto (1993 Tronto ( /2000 , 'art' is not an activity involving caring practices; Tronto argues that 'among the activities of life that do not generally constitute care we would probably include the following: the pursuit of pleasure, creative activity, production, destruction. To play, to fulfil a desire, to market a new project, or to create a work of art, is not care' (p. 104). I suspect that Tronto's demarcation of what constitutes care seems to betray a conventional hierarchy that relegates play, pleasure and aesthetics to a secondary plane in contrast to putative more fundamental (bodily/ethical) needs. Yet the lesson from my particular reading of the enactive approach is that persons are constituted by social life through and through and thus the boundary between fundamental needs and the secondary ones responds to unnecessary habits of thought. Thus, (contrary to Tronto) I propose that many forms of social practice do constitute a matrix of care identity insofar as we understand social life in its fullest generative sense. In social practice, our sensorimotor, aesthetic and ethic identities are continuously shaped, continued, maintained and repaired. Moreover, we may experience such processes of identity as the continuous balancing of our needs and need-oriented caring; our identities are drawn out in the tension between constant need and care. This brings us to one of the enactivist's central insights: the idea of life's generative tension manifested in a kind of 'needful freedom' (Jonas, 1966 , in Di Paolo, 2005 . Whereas the cell system's concern is to conserve a unity in the face of not being, by means of incessant material turnover that exposes itself to the environment, the person system maintains an identity by reaching out and exposing itself to new domains of joint activity in social life (including, for example, artistic practices). This openness in social life is, of course, also a possible source of disintegration -there's always a risk of losing one's autonomy! 15
Caring practice and empathy
Finally, I highlight that a caring practice perspective responds to the explanatory unit of enactivism by insisting on a relational and non-reductionist view of interactions and intersubjectivity. This can be contrasted with other approaches to intersubjectivity that seem to assume an individual or observer's point of view as their starting point. In this case, the caring practice perspective is different from most elaborations on the notion of empathy. Unlike care, empathy can be conceptualised in entirely individualistic terms and even in biological reductionistic ways. For example, empathy can be conceptualised as a fixed personality trait (empathy as a building block of personality) or as part of an internal bodily architecture (see mirror neuron system (MNS) discussions; Gallese et al., 2005) .
I emphasise that a caring practice perspective, in contrast to a view of empathy, is better poised to capture some of the non-reducible processes at the heart of social life. It captures both a dynamical self-maintaining process and a phenomenological version of life's concern. Moreover, in hierarchical relation to empathy, caring practices may have a primordial role. They may be conceptualised as the common ground on which persons become skilful 'empathisers'.
It is worth a brief review of the concept of empathy. Contemporary understanding of empathy is heterogeneous and in many cases discontinuous. Philosopher Shaun Gallagher notes that empathy refers to at least four very distinctive notions found across the philosophical, cognitive science, neuroscience and phenomenological literature. First, it is understood as motor resonance. This view refers to the automaticity of a resonating mechanism that seems to be inbuilt in the brain architecture, especially in the so-called MNS (Gallese, 2010) . For the proponents of the MNS view, persons have lower order capacities for empathetic activation of neuronal regions upon seeing other persons executing actions or undergoing pain. That is, my empathy for your pain (you hit yourself with the hammer) is identical to the firing of my MNS (my neurons mirror the actions that lead to the pain your body undergoes). Second, empathy is understood as a kind of specialised direct perception. This view corresponds to the original notion of Einfu¨hlung as popularised by Edith Stein and more recently formulated by phenomenologist Dan Zahavi (2014) among others (Gallagher, & Zahavi, 2007) . In this view, the situation of the other appears to oneself as a pre-reflective intuition. That is, the other's state as instantiated in their conduct is directly disclosed to me (my experience) without recourse to inferences about their mental states. Third, empathy is understood as simulation. This view corresponds to the widespread view of empathy in terms of 'putting oneself in the other's shoes'. In these terms, empathy is a top-down cognitive operation in which past memories and emotional contents are supposedly recruited in order to have an understanding of the other's situations. Fourth, more recent developments of narrative practice theory (Hutto, 2008) and narrative clinical practice make an emphasis on the narrative origins of empathy. According to these views, persons can gain empathic competency via the practice of narrativeformatted imagination. Persons acquire this competency by being exposed to stories and fictional or real 'persons narratives' of actions, motivations and outcomes (or folk psychological narratives in Hutto's terms). Gallagher favours a multiple understanding of empathy whereby different experiences are elicited by different kinds of situations (familiar, unfamiliar persons) and kinds of interactions (direct, fictional, etc.) . For Gallagher, empathy can be understood as an aesthetic/sensorimotor notion (direct experience of the other's pain for example), a categorical notion (empathy to others who are familiar to me) or a situational notion (empathy to others who may be very different from me). The notion of empathy thus presented refers to a cluster of concepts around the idea of a relational and temporal involvement of the other's situation.
This view of empathy is pluralist and reaches beyond the enactive approach. I suggest, however, that it misses the target with respect to the explanatory unit of sensemaking. More speculatively, it is not tight enough to show the primordial role of social living in the constitution of sense-making. So, take, for example, the narrative practice version aforementioned; the narratives that allow us to be empathetic to the suffering of anonymous persons far beyond our own social spheres (persons in war-torn countries for example) are not found in some neutral repertoire of narratives, but form a corpus of stories that belong to the multiple communities of practice in which we participate. In the act of taking an empathetic position, an act of moral imagination (see Nussbaum, 2016) , we are also simultaneously rehearsing the identities relative to our current participatory positions. 16 The triggering of narratives thus assumes an underlying participatory process that, as I have argued, relies on caring practices. Similarly, the incorporation of the other's perspective in one's social skills may involve more basic forms of empathy that do not rely on explicit narratives. They may rely on practices of orientation of attention, in such cases, towards facial expressions, gestures or body movements (for example, of pain, joy, etc.). Once again, these forms of bodily orientation are immersed in the dynamics of our social lives. Hence, I speculate that the above heterogeneous definitions of empathy may be traced back to caring practices at the heart of processes of individuation and identity, not to alleged cultural or biological building blocks.
17 What makes us empathetic carers is our constitutive interdependency in social life.
Outline towards an enactive
anthropology of caring I propose to see social life as the loci of various caring practices that manifest basic inter-bodily patterns of identity maintenance and intersubjective concern. Caring involves forms of maintenance of dynamic patterns of conduct and affectivity, situations and objects of interest. In other words, it conveys the precarious interdependencies that emerge, correspond to and are maintained by the co-defined actions of persons and their PSM. Different degrees of implicit or explicit values and normativity intervene in order to make the interdependencies exist as a background for further meaningful participation.
The following is an outline of some of the characteristics of the perspective. These are proposed speculatively as a step towards an enactive anthropology of caring:
Caring refers to a relational view of persons as necessarily interdependent. With caring, I emphasise different levels of co-action, co-ownership and co-authorship. In the vocabulary of ethics of care, these levels correspond to ways of defining practices of caring about, taking care, care-giving and care-receiving. Thus, because of its relational character, caring cannot be fully accounted as an individual or unilateral action (this has consequences for our conceptions of ethics). Caring is developmentally primordial. It corresponds diachronically to the practices that shape persons' identities in communities via sustained interactions with caregivers and other participants. Full-blown caring practices with different degrees of complexity and power balance (symmetry or asymmetry of care and needs) as well as the capacity for empathy need to be traced back to earlier intersubjectivity in childhood. Caring is primordial in participation. This point is a crucial part of the proposal towards a caring perspective since it establishes an implicit level of caring -a kind of ecologically emergent trans-personal dynamical process. I propose that caring is not only an explicit practice (for example, a practice of care in the health sector). This point is best understood vis-a-vis the emerging autonomy and selforganisation at the group practice level.
18 An implicit caring process refers to a minimal form in which one's bodily values and conditions of viability are necessarily tied to the social-other's bodily values as well as to the participatory enactment of a community. The proposal is thus to distinguish two levels of caring; on the one hand, caring as a sociolinguistic arena (as ethics) and, on the other, as an implicit disposition orchestrated in the course of social participation. Caring points to the affective dimension and the attentiveness of experience. Caring captures a firstperson experience of opening, directionality and concern towards the world and others. In social life, the world and others are not presented as neutral or devoid of affective tones or salience; instead, world, others, as well as Self appear, at different moments, to solicit or demand attentiveness and tactful skill. A vital value is associated with maintaining their precarious interweaving. Caring involves normativity in and through practice. Relations of care are sensitive to relative norms; that is, actions can be done wrongly or correctly according to variously stable (always dynamical or temporal) norms and values. The normativity present in sociality need not be accounted for in terms of fixed or pre-given constraints, rather enaction in sociality always brings to life (specifies) the normativities present at various timescales. To become a member in a community is to care in appropriate ways. Caring can be seen as part of a skilful practice. Sense-making can be contextualised as forms of skilfulness that develop in participation in social life. Persons become skilful sense-makers whereby the attention to social dynamics is configured into patterns of care. Primordial life's concern is reorganised through participation into tendencies for skilful action that seek to maintain, continue and re-establish the viability of the individual immersed in social life. Caring allows a wide conversation across disciplinary boundaries. The consideration of transformation inherent in human experience needs to be put in conversation with the scientific study of the mind. The caring practice perspective highlights the nuances and continuities that are necessary in order to anchor the conditions for transformation onto a non-reductionist and naturalistic ground. The larger projects of understanding human sensemaking on the one hand, and human transformation on the other, should not be seen as entirely separate projects (one scientific or biological, the other critical and humanistic). Specifically, the project of an ethic of care that tackles the conditions of oppression and the role of power and violence gains a depth of field by incorporating conceptual links with naturalistic views of life. In this way, I suggest that the caring practice perspective is another way of moving beyond the biology/socio-culture disciplinary divide.
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2. Not everyone in the enactivist discussion agrees with this. This discussion reaches beyond the aim of the current exposition. 3. Although the body creates an interiority, the body itself is not that interiority. Several critics of the original 'embodied mind' idea by Varela et al., including Susan Oyama and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, have pointed out the solipsistic nature of the concept of embodiment. They see the idea of embodiment as a kind of unnecessary encapsulation of the mind in the interior of the body (see also Ingold, 2000) . I suggest that a better reading of the argument of embodiment brings the idea that the dynamics of the organism in open exchange with the environment are centred around the body but not encapsulated in it. This centralisation in the body is the emergence of an interiority of experience in the form of a first-person perspective. The first-person perspective, however, is just one aspect of the open system dynamics of organism and environment, but not a proof that the mind is located somewhere 'inside'. 4. See Loaiza (2016) for a discussion of this in terms of musical social life or musicking. 5. This points to some conventional ways of looking at social life which prevent the investigation of the envisioned continuity. Social cognition and sociality, in particular, and social life in general tend to be seen conventionally as secondary stages for what is otherwise thought of as an individual's business of solitary cognition and experiencing. Other persons, in that view, are simply external triggers of the individual's interior mentality. More generally, social life is commonly seen as a separate realm superimposed onto a biological substrate. According to this commonplace view, human beings are exceptional in that they live their lives between two entirely different causal frames: one related to culture and history, the other to a putative more basic 'nature'-that is, biology. This view is a re-description of an old dichotomy of biology/culture, or nature/history (see Ingold, 2000) . The ultimate aim of an envisioned enactive anthropology is to overcome that unnecessary yet persistent dichotomy nature/culture. 6. From a global perspective, social life can also be understood as manifesting self-organising behaviour. Lave and Wenger precisely use the metaphor of a 'centripetal' force in their description of the movement from peripheral (newcomers) to central participation (old-timers) in the history of the community. A vortex, however, is perhaps a more adequate metaphor. A kind of participatory gradient is analogous to the energy gradient of a vortex that precipitates the spiralling of many individuals along the slow timescale of community history. The necessary interpersonal asymmetries within cycles of participation provide the catalyst for collective and personal individuation. At the slow macro-timescale of history, we find a 'chain reaction' via many overlapping cycles of participation. For Lave and Wenger (1991) , Legitimate peripheral participation moves in a centripetal direction, motivated by its location in a field of mature practice. It is motivated by the growing use value of participation, and by newcomers' desires to become full practitioners. Communities of practice have histories and developmental cycles, and reproduce themselves in such a way that the transformation of newcomers into old-timers becomes unremarkably integral to the practice. (p. 122) 7. Evidence of autonomous interactive dynamics is available in experiments with minimal agents (simulation models in Di Paolo (2009, 2011) ) and unidimensional environments for human agents (see Auvray & Rohde, 2012; Froese et al., 2014; Lenay & Stewart, 2012) via the 'Perceptual Crossing Paradigm' (Auvray, Lenay, & Stewart, 2009 ). 8. See the distinction in Noddings (1984) between natural care (want to) and ethical care (must). 9. See Murray and Trevarthen's (1985) classic experiment 'Emotional regulations of interactions between 2-month olds and mothers'. 10. This autonomy should not be confused with the autonomy notion in the enactive approach. The autonomy of a ratio-cognitive agent, as classically understood, is grounded on a substantialist ontology that conceives of individuals as entities that possess autonomy and have identity against change. Moreover, the notion of autonomy features in a larger discussion in feminist theory. The concept of 'relational autonomy' is a way of reaching beyond the deficiencies of the ratio-cognitive view. See, for example, the work of Catriona Mackenzie, Natalie Stoljar and Susan Sherwin. Thanks to a reviewer for pointing to this larger discussion in feminist theory. 11. Notice also that the self-made man is also a fully able body who does not require any care by default and so he cannot be rendered needy or vulnerable. 12. With respect to the idea of positions of care, the synthesis of Tronto's ideas with those of Lave and Wenger yields a very interesting way of analysing the move towards full participation in communities of practice. The move may not only be conceived of in terms of changing positions along a landscape of activities defined by division of labour but also be understood as changes in positions relative to distinctive caring dynamics.
According to this, we may expect to see newcomers and peripheral participants as the ones that more often give care. Conversely, we may expect to see old-timers and fully mature participants as the ones that care about (but do not give care themselves). This is consistent with Tronto's characterisation of care as having multivalence; giving care on the one hand is persistently located at the bottom of the hierarchy (for example, domestic service), whereas caring about is usually associated with high-profile public figures (for example, politicians or philanthropists). 13. Thanks to a reviewer for highlighting this aspect. 14. This, of course, does not imply that the use of power and violence is not part of social practices, especially when these are mediated by inflexible organisational structures. But, in a way, the caring practice perspective proposes a complementary alternative to the kind of 'power-only' reductionism of conventional social sciences.
15. For Butler, this points to a more pervasive and constitutive condition of social life: in being together with others, we do not only find that our relations are specified by bonds and affinities, but also find ourselves dispossessed by our relations, 'we're undone by each other' (p. 23). 16. Arguably, it would be possible to establish the structure of person's moral imagination in correlation with their position in a matrix of caring practices. Persons can be 'carers about', can 'take care', can 'receive care' and so on. This requires further unpacking beyond the current proposal. 17. There are reasons, however, to privilege in the analysis an empathy-first perspective rather than a primordial caring practice perspective. As mentioned in the text, in the ethical philosophy arena it is necessary to present the problem of how we empathise with persons outside of our societies, persons with whom no possible face-toface interaction can occur. What needs to be added to such discussions is that the kind of empathy at play in such cases belongs entirely to narrative practices and thus the problem of long-distance empathy becomes a problem of how to improve our narratives and make them more available, for example, through the public and social media. 18. Complexity and Nursing theorist Marilyn Ray proposes a similar way of understanding caring as 'relational selforganisation' (see Ray, 1994, pp. 23-32) .
